Framework overlap

Does ASD Strategies to Mitigate Cyber Security Incidents cover IAEA Nuclear Security Series?

You hold ASD Strategies to Mitigate Cyber Security Incidents and have been told to do IAEA Nuclear Security Series. Here is how much overlaps, control by control.

73% of IAEA Nuclear Security Series you already have

ASD Strategies to Mitigate Cyber Security Incidents already covers about 73% of IAEA Nuclear Security Series, leaving 3 of 11 controls as genuinely new work.

Already covered 2 Likely covered 6 New work 3

What is genuinely new work

Nothing in ASD Strategies to Mitigate Cyber Security Incidents reaches these. This is the list to scope.

IAEA-NSS17-Personnel-Trustworthiness-Training-Awareness
IAEA NSS-17 - Personnel Security + Trustworthiness + Training + Awareness + Cyber Hygiene
IAEA-NSS17-Physical-Lifecycle-Decommissioning-Safety-Emergency
IAEA NSS-17 - Physical Protection of Computer Systems + Lifecycle + Decommissioning + Safety + Emergency Preparedness Interface
IAEA-NSS17-Vulnerability-Patch-RemovableMedia-Portable
IAEA NSS-17 - Vulnerability Management + Patch + Removable Media + Portable Device Control
Show the 8 you already have
IAEA-NSS17-Detect-Monitor-Logging-IR-Recovery-Exercises
IAEA NSS-17 - Detection + Monitoring + Logging + Incident Response + Recovery + Computer Security Exercises
IAEA-NSS17-SystemIntegrity-Configuration-Change-Management
IAEA NSS-17 - System Integrity + Configuration Management + Change Management + Baseline + Hardening
IAEA-NSS17-AccessControl-OT-IT-Authentication-Authorization
IAEA NSS-17 - Access Control + Authentication + Authorization + IAM + Privileged Access for OT and IT
IAEA-NSS17-Architecture-Zones-DefenceInDepth-Segmentation
IAEA NSS-17 - Computer Security Architecture + Zone Model + Defence in Depth + Network Segmentation + Boundary
IAEA-NSS17-Assurance-Regulator-Inspection-Reporting-Improvement
IAEA NSS-17 - Assurance Activities + Regulator Interface + Inspection + Reporting + Information Sharing + Continuous Improvement
IAEA-NSS17-GradedApproach-SecurityLevels-Risk-DBT
IAEA NSS-17 - Graded Approach + Computer Security Levels + Risk-Informed Methodology + Threat Assessment + DBT Alignment + Consequence Analysis
IAEA-NSS17-Scope-NSS-Family-CSP-Establishment
IAEA NSS-17 + NSS-42-G - Scope + Nuclear Security Series Family + Computer Security Programme Establishment + Roles + Management System Integration
IAEA-NSS17-SupplyChain-ThirdParty-OEM-Trust
IAEA NSS-17 - Supply Chain + Third Party + OEM + Vendor Security + Trustworthy Components

How this is calculated

Already covered means a mapping runs from a control in ASD Strategies to Mitigate Cyber Security Incidents to that control. Likely covered means no direct mapping exists but both frameworks map to the same control in a third standard. New work means neither. We keep those separate rather than adding them into one friendlier number, because blending them would present a two-hop inference as a verified fact.

Coverage is not symmetric. Run it the other way and you will get a different number; both are correct.

From 332,959 cross-framework control mappings across 723 frameworks, 531 of them verified against their source documents. It does not tell you that you are compliant: a mapped control means the two standards ask for the same thing, not that you have done it.

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